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GRIFFIN V. ILLINOIS: JUSTICE INDEPENDENT OF
WEALTH?

Neil L. Sobol*
“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has.”1
—Justice Hugo Black (1956)
“My work with the poor and the incarcerated has persuaded me that
the opposite of poverty is not wealth; the opposite of poverty is
justice.”2
—Bryan Stevenson (2014)

I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Hugo Black’s frequently quoted comment from Griffin v.
Illinois3 reflects a fundamental notion that justice should not depend on
the financial resources of a defendant.4 Unfortunately, more than sixty
years after Justice Black’s warning, the American justice system remains

*
© 2020, Neil L. Sobol. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of
Law. J.D., cum laude, Order of the Coif, Southern Methodist University; M.S. and B.A., with distinction,
Stanford University. This Article was inspired by a panel organized by Professors Cynthia Alkon and
Catherine Hancock for the 2018 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Conference regarding the
impact of the Warren Court on the Criminal Justice System. Stetson University College of Law did
an outstanding job of hosting a symposium on the issue. I appreciate the hospitality shown by the
editors and staff of the Stetson Law Review and Professors Marco Jimenez and Ellen Podgor. I am
grateful for the feedback I received at the symposium and the editorial suggestions I received during
the editing process. Above all, I appreciate the support and understanding from my wife, Rebecca,
and my daughters, Megan, Aubrey, and Ella.
1. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
2. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 18 (2014).
3. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
4. Id. at 19; see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 107 (2000)
(characterizing Justice Black’s statement as “one of the most famous sentences in the United States
Reports”); Bertram F. Willcox & Edward J. Bloustein, The Griffin Case—Poverty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 9 (1957) (declaring that Griffin states “clearly, and for the first time,
that a state may not condition a person’s assertion of basic legal rights on financial ability”).
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a two-tier system, reflecting Bryan Stevenson’s concerns that many
defendants face injustice because of their poverty.5
Under the current system, indigent defendants are more likely to
face difficulty obtaining adequate representation, more likely to be jailed
before trial, more likely to plead guilty to avoid continued incarceration,
more likely to face difficulty with fees assessed during incarceration,
more likely to face continued monetary charges while on probation or
parole, and more likely to face incarceration based on inability to pay
criminal justice debt.6 Moreover, the collateral consequences arising
from these differences are significant, often trapping indigent
defendants and their families in a never-ending cycle of debt, leading to
additional confrontations with the justice system, and creating fear and
distrust.7
This Article describes Griffin and its impact on jurisprudence
regarding a defendant’s ability to pay on the justice the defendant
receives. In many ways, Griffin laid the foundation for case law and
legislation designed to address equal protection and due process
concerns for defendants who lack financial resources.8 Unfortunately,
despite subsequent rulings and statutes, actual practice shows that the
justice system, instead of providing justice independent of wealth,
remains a two-tier system with wealthy defendants receiving justice
while those without resources face injustice.9
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II focuses on the promise
of Griffin and its progeny of Supreme Court cases to foster a system
where justice is independent of a defendant’s wealth or income level.
Unfortunately, as Part III illustrates, the equal justice promise of Griffin
has gone largely unfulfilled in modern society. Indigent defendants
confront and struggle with a different system of justice than defendants
who have financial resources. Moreover, such a system creates collateral
consequences that tend to perpetuate the inequities in the criminal
justice system and society in general. Part IV identifies the hopes for
5. STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 18.
6. See infra pt. III.B (discussing the two-tier system of criminal justice that indigent defendants
face).
7. TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT, PAY OR STAY: THE HIGH COST OF JAILING TEXANS FOR
FINES & FEES 4–6 (2017).
8. Note, Fining the Indigent, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1971).
9. See infra pt. III.B. The concept of access to justice is related to the idea of equal justice;
however, it focuses on the ability of the system to provide resources to defendants. The question of
access to justice is beyond the scope of this Article. For more information, see, e.g., Deborah L.
Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001); Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under
Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2003); Jennifer M. Smith, Rationed
Justice, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353 (2016).
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restoring the promise of Griffin. Specifically, it presents an overview of
some reforms and recommendations to help the system move away
from Bryan Stevenson’s concerns over the injustice of poverty to better
reflect the promise of Justice Hugo Black’s concept of equal justice.
II. THE PROMISE: JUSTICE NOT DEPENDENT ON WEALTH
This Part describes the development of Justice Black’s notion that
justice provided to defendants should not be dependent on one’s
financial resources. It provides a brief analysis of Griffin and develops
how subsequent Supreme Court cases have expanded the reach of
Griffin’s equal justice.
A. Griffin v. Illinois—Establishing the Promise
Interestingly, Griffin, the case generally cited for establishing the
concepts of equal justice for indigent defendants in the criminal justice
system, dealt with an indigent’s struggle at the appellate rather than trial
stage.10 Specifically, the issue in Griffin was whether the requirement
that defendants pay a fee for a trial transcript necessary for an appeal
violated the due process and equal protection rights of indigent
defendants.11 An Illinois county criminal court had convicted Judson
Griffin and James Crenshaw of armed robbery. Griffin and Crenshaw
filed a request for a certified copy of the record, including a trial
transcript, so that they could appeal their convictions under state law.
Their request asserted that they were “‘poor persons with no means of
paying the necessary fees to acquire the Transcript and Court Records
needed to prosecute an appeal.’”12 The trial court denied the request
without a hearing.13 While Illinois law waived transcript fees for
indigent defendants in capital cases, it generally did not permit waiver
in other criminal matters.14
Similarly, the trial court, without hearing any evidence, denied a
request under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act claiming that the
refusal to provide the transcript to the indigent defendants violated due

10. Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 4, at 1–2 (predicting that Griffin would be a “milestone” case
because its analysis was “broad enough to apply to many other of the injustices arising from the
poverty of litigants”).
11. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13, 16 (1956).
12. Id. at 13.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 14 (citing 38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 769a (1955)).
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process and equal protection.15 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
decision on the basis that no substantial state or federal constitutional
grounds were raised.16 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment and remanded the matter.17
Justice Black authored the plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Clark and Douglas.18 Justice Frankfurter filed a
concurring opinion,19 and the remaining four justices dissented.20
In his decision, Justice Black referred to both due process and equal
protection concerns.21 He stated that the clauses “call for procedures in
criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between
persons . . . [so that] all people charged with crime must, so far as the law
is concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every
American court.’”22 Further, he acknowledged that the concept that
treatment under the law should not be dependent on one’s wealth was
not a new idea, instead, “[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak
and powerful alike is an age-old problem.”23 He compared
discrimination based on poverty to other forms of discrimination: “In
criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color.”24

15. Id. at 15 (citing 38 ILL. REV. STAT. §§ 826–832 (1955)).
16. Id. at 15–16.
17. Id. at 20.
18. Id. at 13.
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id. at 26.
21. Id. at 16–17. A detailed analysis of the constitutional basis for Griffin is beyond the scope of
this Article. Judges and scholars have addressed Justice Black’s reliance on the due process and
equal protection clauses. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(declaring that Griffin relied “on a blend of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses”); Ralph
S. Abascal, Municipal Services and Equal Protection: Variations on a Theme by Griffin v. Illinois, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 1367, 1376 (1969) (stating Griffin “presented a dominant equal protection question,
yet Justice Black persisted in averting to the due process clause as well”); Willcox & Bloustein, supra
note 4, at 2 (stating that Griffin was “the first time the Supreme Court has addressed itself squarely
to the impact of poverty on constitutional rights under the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment”). Additionally, Willcox and Bloustein, citing five law review articles
written shortly after Griffin, state that “[m]ost law review commentators consider that the Griffin
decision was based both on due process and on equal protection.” Id. at 10 n.39 (citations omitted).
For recent discussions of the constitutional basis for Griffin, see Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal
Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 62–64 (2019) (asserting that Griffin’s reliance on both due
process and equal protection concerns laid the basis for scrutiny different than the traditional
notions of scrutiny associated with either clause and applying this approach to voter
disenfranchisement based on the inability to pay criminal justice debt); Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth,
Equal Protection, and Due Process, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2019) (adopting the term “equal
process” to describe the combined application of the equal protection and due process clauses to
constitutional concerns regarding wealth inequality).
22. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 17.
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Inability to pay does not mean a defendant should be denied justice,
as Justice Black elaborated, “[p]lainly the ability to pay costs in advance
bears no rational relationship to a defendant’s guilt or innocence and
could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.”25
Moreover, Justice Black asserted that concerns about
discrimination should not be limited to trial but extend to appellate
review.26 He commented, “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between
a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a
trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate
appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the
costs in advance.”27 While Justice Black conceded that states are not
required to provide an appellate review, he found that if states do
establish an appeal process, then states cannot discriminate based on an
appellant’s inability to pay.28
Justice Black acknowledged that given the substantial number of
reversals of criminal convictions, states recognize the importance of the
appellate process to the final determination of guilt.29 As a result, he
concluded with his often-quoted statement: “There can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of
money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate
appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy
transcripts.”30
The four dissenting Justices sympathized with the notion that a
state should pay for the indigent defendant’s transcript; however, they
declared that the matter did not rise to the level of a federal
constitutional violation. Instead, the dissenters felt that the issue should
remain a matter of state policy.31 In response, Justice Black asserted that
while the case did raise a federal constitutional violation, it did not
require that states pay for the transcripts for appeals for all indigents—
instead, states can establish corrective rules “of affording adequate and

25. Id. at 17–18.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 18–19 (citing Note, Reversals in Illinois Criminal Cases, 42 HARV. L. REV. 566, 566–67
(1929)).
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id. at 28 (Burton and Minton, JJ., with Harlan and Reed, JJ., dissenting) (stating that the
Constitution does not mandate that a state make “defendants economically equal before its bar of
justice” even though it “may be a desirable social policy”). Similarly, in a separate dissenting opinion,
Justice Harlan asserts, “[h]owever strong may be one’s inclination to hasten the day when in forma
pauperis criminal procedures will be universal among the States, I think it is beyond the province
of this Court to tell Illinois that it must provide such procedures.” Id. at 39 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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effective appellate review to indigent defendants. For example, it may be
that bystanders’ bills of exceptions or other methods of reporting trial
proceedings could be used in some cases.”32
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the judgment. Like the Justices in
the plurality opinion, he recognized that due process does not require
appeals and that states may limit appeals to death penalty matters, but
that states may not “shut off means of appellate review for indigent
defendants” by requiring payment for a trial transcript.33 According to
Justice Frankfurter, if a state sets up an appellate process, “it cannot
make lack of means an effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity.”34
He also agreed that the state should be able to establish requirements
for appeal by indigents whether it be by providing the transcript or other
means.35
His concurrence added two major concepts that relate to concerns
about the expenses that a state may incur based on the Court’s decision.
First, he pointed out that states can establish procedures to prevent the
public subsidy of frivolous appeals.36 As he stated, the State should
“neither bolt the door to equal justice nor support a wasteful abuse of
the appellate process.”37 Second, Justice Frankfurter asserted that the
Court’s pronouncement should only apply on a prospective basis.38
B. The Griffin Progeny—Spreading the Promise
Griffin provided the foundation for the Supreme Court to develop
the law regarding the treatment of indigent defendants in the criminal
justice system.39 Since its publication in 1956, more than 3,380 cases
have cited Griffin, and the Supreme Court has referred to it on at least
120 occasions.40 This Part will briefly address the Supreme Court’s
application of the equal justice concepts from Griffin to criminal justice
matters.41
32. Id. at 20.
33. Id. at 22–23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 24.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 25. The four dissenting Justices also sided with Justice Frankfurter’s theory against
retroactive application. Id. at 29 (Burton and Minton, JJ., with Harlan and Reed, JJ., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., John Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1191, 1217 (1999) (declaring that Griffin “marks the beginning of a new phase of the Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence”).
40. Based on a Westlaw KeyCite review on December 31, 2019.
41. A detailed analysis of the individual cases discussed is beyond the scope of this Article.
Many of them have already been the subject of substantial legal scholarship. Additionally, this
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1. Transcript Fees
Griffin would become the “watershed” case for matters involving
monetary charges for transcripts.42 For example, in a per curiam opinion
in Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles,43 the
Court relied on Griffin to find that the court’s refusal to provide an
indigent defendant a trial transcript based on the trial court’s
determination of no reversible error at trial violated the defendant’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights.44 The Court found that the trial court’s
decision on the matter was not “an adequate substitute for the right to
full appellate review available to all defendants in Washington who can
afford the expense of a transcript.”45 As with Griffin, the Court allowed
for the possibility of states offering alternatives to free transcripts as
long as states provide indigent defendants “as adequate appellate
review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.”46
Similarly, in Draper v. Washington,47 the Court applied Griffin and
Eskridge to find that a trial court’s denial of the requests by indigent
defendants for free trial transcripts on the basis that their assignment of
errors was frivolous violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.48 The
Court found the determination that a case was frivolous was an
“inadequate substitute for the full appellate review available to
nonindigents in Washington, when the effect of that finding is to prevent
an appellate examination based upon a sufficiently complete record of
the trial proceedings themselves.”49
Fifteen years after Griffin, the Court extended its holding from
felony cases involving incarceration to matters where the sentences
Article does not discuss the Court’s use of Griffin in the civil context. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 124 (1996) (applying Griffin to civil proceeding involving the termination of parental rights);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (applying Griffin to the state’s system of denying
welfare recipients the ability to divorce because they were unable to pay court fees and costs). See
also Abascal, supra note 21, at 1376 (asserting Griffin should apply to the unequal provision of
municipal services).
42. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193 (1971); see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIM. PROC.
§ 11.2(d) (4th ed. 2018) (stating that Griffin “spawned a long line of Supreme Court and lower court
cases dealing with the indigent defendant’s right to a transcript provided at state expense”). A
related matter, beyond the scope of this Article, is how courts determine if an individual qualifies
for the state’s payment of a trial transcript. See Ronald A. Case, Annotation, Determination of
Indigency of Accused Entitling Him to Transcript or Similar Record for Purposes of Appeal, 66 A.L.R.3D
954 (1975).
43. 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam).
44. Id. at 216.
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
47. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
48. Id. at 499–500.
49. Id.
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were limited to fines. In Mayer v. City of Chicago,50 the Court reasoned
that “[t]he size of the defendant’s pocketbook bears no more
relationship to his guilt or innocence in a nonfelony than in a felony
case.”51
Mayer arose from an incident that occurred at a 1969
demonstration in Chicago that was part of the Days of Rage organized by
the Weathermen, an anti-war group.52 Jack Mayer, a third-year medical
student serving as a first-aid assistant, allegedly got into a skirmish with
a police officer and prevented officers from moving an injured party.53
Mayer was charged with and convicted of violating two city ordinances
regarding disorderly conduct and interference with a police officer.54
The maximum penalty for the violation of each ordinance was $500 and
had no incarceration option.55 The trial court assessed a $250 fine for
each violation.56 Although the trial court found that the defendant was
indigent, the court denied his request for a free transcript for his appeal
on the basis that the Illinois Supreme Court rule applied only to
felonies.57 The Illinois Supreme Court also denied the defendant’s
request.58
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court not only extended
Griffin to non-felony matters but also identified current concerns
relating to the abuses associated with criminal justice debt. For example,
the Court referred to the collateral consequences associated with a
conviction, including the inability to obtain a medical license:59
The practical effects of conviction of even petty offenses of the kind
involved here are not to be minimized. A fine may bear as heavily on
an indigent accused as forced confinement. The collateral
consequences of conviction may be even more serious, as when . . .
the impecunious medical student finds himself barred from the

50. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
51. Id. at 196.
52. For more information about the Weathermen and the Days of Rage, see BRYAN BURROUGH,
DAYS OF RAGE: AMERICA’S RADICAL UNDERGROUND, THE FBI, AND THE FORGOTTEN AGE OF REVOLUTIONARY
VIOLENCE (2015).
53. City of Chicago v. Mayer, 308 N.E.2d 601, 602–03 (Ill. 1974). Mayer refused to allow the
officers to move the injured man claiming he “was paralyzed from the waist down and had a
probable spine injury.” Id. at 603.
54. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 190.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 190–91.
58. Id. at 193.
59. Id. at 197. See infra pt. III.B.2 (discussing the collateral consequences that indigent
defendants currently face in the criminal justice system).
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practice of medicine because of a conviction he is unable to appeal
for lack of funds.60

Similarly, the Court warned that the state’s reliance on financial
concerns could create tension in the relationships that citizens have with
police and trial courts:61
“[I]t is the police and the lower court Bench and Bar that convey the
essence of our democracy to the people. . . .” Arbitrary denial of
appellate review of proceedings of the State’s lowest trial courts may
save the State some dollars and cents, but only at the substantial risk
of generating frustration and hostility toward its courts among the
most numerous consumers of justice.62

2. Other Appellate Fees
A relatively small step from Griffin’s analysis of transcript fees for
appeals was the extension of Griffin’s rationale to cases involving other
types of appellate fees.63 For example, in Burns v. Ohio,64 the Court
addressed “whether a State may constitutionally require that an
indigent defendant in a criminal case pay a filing fee before permitting
him to file a motion for leave to appeal in one of its courts.”65 The State
tried to distinguish Griffin because the defendant had already received
an appeal at the intermediate court level so that the State did not have
to also pay for an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. Writing for the
majority and relying on Griffin, Chief Justice Warren denied the
distinction:
This is a distinction without a difference for, as Griffin holds, once the
State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may
not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where
the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase

60. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197.
61. Id. at 197–98.
62. Id. (quoting Patrick V. Murphy, The Role of the Police in Our Modern Society, in 26 THE RECORD
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 292, 293 (1971)).
63. See Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 4, at 17; see also Frederick G. Hamley, Impact of Griffin
v. Illinois on State Court-Federal Court Relationships, 24 F.R.D. 75, 78 (1958) (stating that the
“principle there announced [in Griffin] would apply to any court costs necessarily incurred in taking
an appeal” and Griffin would probably apply to other appellate fees or expenses required by court
rules or legislation).
64. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
65. Id. at 253.
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of its appellant procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the
second phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency.66

The Court found that the denial of defendant’s leave to appeal based on
inability to pay a filing fee was, in certain respects, “more final and
disastrous” than the denial of the payment of the transcript fee in
Griffin.67 The Court reasoned that the defendant in Griffin at least could
still raise trial errors, while the defendant in Burns could not obtain any
review from the Ohio Supreme Court.68 The Court declared that
imposing “financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate
review for indigent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of
Equal Justice Under Law.”69
The Court would extend its analysis from Griffin and Burns to
habeas corpus proceedings in Smith v. Bennett,70 where Iowa required
payment of filing fees for an application of writ or appeal.71 Finding the
requirement unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated: “We hold that to interpose
any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State
and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that
prisoner the equal protection of the laws.”72 The Court refuted the State’s
claim that the $4 fee was “an extremely nominal sum” declaring that “if
one does not have it and is unable to get it the fee might as well be
$400.”73
3. Appointed Counsel
Shortly after Griffin, commentators predicted that Griffin would
become the basis for requiring states to provide counsel to indigent
defendants.74 Seven years later, in Douglas v. California,75 the Court
would require California to provide appellate counsel for an indigent
defendant.76 The Court’s decision was limited to criminal appeals

66. Id. at 257.
67. Id. at 258.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
71. Id. at 708.
72. Id. at 709.
73. Id. at 712.
74. See Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10
(1956); Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 4, at 23–24.
75. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
76. Id. at 355–58.
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granted under California law as a matter of right.77 The state appellate
court had denied counsel for indigent defendants based on its review of
the record and determination that “‘no good whatever could be served
by appointment of counsel.’”78 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court, relying on Griffin, declared that “where the merits of the one and
only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of
counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich
and poor.”79 The Court found that California’s procedures of denying
appellate counsel to indigents violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
precluded meaningful appeals for the poor.80
On the same day that the Court issued Douglas, the Court would
release Gideon v. Wainwright81—its most famous case in the Griffin
progeny.82 Interestingly, the only mention of Griffin in Gideon is in a
footnote in Justice Clark’s concurrence, identifying Griffin as one of the
“portents” of Gideon.83
Justice Black, however, the author of the plurality opinion in Griffin,
wrote the unanimous decision in Gideon.84 Under Gideon, the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires states to provide counsel to indigent defendants
in felony trials.85 In rendering its decision, the Court overruled Betts v.
Brady,86 a case involving “nearly indistinguishable”87 facts where the
Court had found that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to
counsel only applied in federal courts.88 Interestingly, in Betts, Justice
Black authored a dissent not only urging the majority to apply the Sixth
Amendment to state court felony trials but also concluding that due
process required that the state provide counsel to indigent defendants.89

77. Id. at 356 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1235, 1237).
78. Id. at 355 (quoting State v. Douglas, 10 Cal. Rptr. 188, 195 (1960)).
79. Id. at 357.
80. Id. at 357–58 (stating “[t]he indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden,
has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal”).
81. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
82. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright—From a 1963 Perspective, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2035, 2036
(2014) (recognizing Gideon as “an icon of the American justice system”). As of December 31, 2019,
Westlaw’s KeyCite function had over 29,000 citing references to Gideon. A detailed discussion of
Gideon is beyond the scope of this Article. See Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Construction &
Application of Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel—Supreme Court Cases, 33 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2009).
83. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 348 n.2 (Clark, J., concurring); Israel, supra note 82, at 2042.
84. 372 U.S. at 336.
85. Id. at 341–44.
86. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
87. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
88. Id. at 339–40.
89. 316 U.S. at 474–75.
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Gideon would allow Justice Black to revisit the ideas he stated in his
dissent in Betts. Although the Sixth Amendment served as the basis of
the Court’s decision, the opinion included language reminiscent of
Justice Black’s concerns in Griffin that a defendant’s lack of financial
resources should not impact the administration of justice.90 For example,
Justice Black commented:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. . . . From the very beginning, our
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials
before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal
before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him.91

On the other hand, in Ross v. Moffitt,92 the Court found that neither the
Equal Protection nor the Due Process Clause allowed for the extension
of Douglas to require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants
in discretionary appeals.93 In reaching its conclusion, the Court traced
the history of the treatment of indigents in state court appeals, beginning
with Griffin and ending with the Douglas requirement that indigent
defendants be provided counsel in their “first appeal as of right.”94
Reconciling Douglas and Ross, the Court in Halbert v. Michigan95
addressed whether an appeal for an indigent convicted following a plea
was more like an appeal as a matter of right under Douglas requiring the
state to provide counsel or like a discretionary appeal under Ross where
state-funded counsel was not required.96 The Court, relying on Griffin
and Douglas, found that due process and equal protection required the
“appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who
seek access to first-tier review.”97
In Evitts v. Lucey,98 the Court would extend its holding from Griffin,
Douglas, and Gideon to require not only that indigent defendants be

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

372 U.S. at 344.
Id.
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id. at 610–12.
Id. at 605–07.
545 U.S. 605 (2005).
Id. at 616–17.
Id. at 610.
469 U.S. 387 (1985).
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entitled to counsel on first right of appeal but also that they have
effective assistance of counsel.99 As the Court declared, “the promise of
Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on appeal—like
the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at
trial—would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.”100
4. Incarceration
While the previous Parts dealt with the use of Griffin to address
inequities that arise at trial or on appeal in determining a defendant’s
guilt, the Court has also extended Griffin’s rationale to the treatment of
convicted defendants.101 Specifically, the analysis from Griffin has played
a significant role in the Court’s decisions relating to the use of
incarceration based on a convicted defendant’s inability to pay criminal
justice debt.
In Williams v. Illinois,102 the Court would first confront the
“[s]ystematic discrimination against indigents in the disposition of
convicted criminals.”103 The issue was whether the state could
incarcerate defendants unable to pay fines and fees beyond a state’s
statutory maximum sentence period.104 The trial court assessed
Williams $5 in costs and imposed the maximum sentence for petty
theft—one year in prison and a $500 fine.105 Because Williams was
unable to pay the monetary charges, the court added 101 days of
incarceration, applying Illinois law that set a rate of $5 per day to pay
down the amounts owed.106 The United States Supreme Court, applying
Griffin, found the process unconstitutional, concluding “that an indigent
criminal defendant may not be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine

99. Id. at 397.
100. Id. Similarly, in Ake v. Oklahoma, the Court required that the state provide an indigent
defendant psychiatric assistance if the defendant “has made a preliminary showing that his sanity
at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial.” 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985). In reaching
its conclusion, the Court cited Griffin and used language reminiscent of Justice Black’s equal justice
quotation by stating “justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is
denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at
stake.” Id. at 76.
101. Fining the Indigent, supra note 8, at 1281.
102. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
103. Fining the Indigent, supra note 8, at 1282.
104. Williams, 399 U.S. at 236.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 236–37 (citing ILL. CRIM. CODE § 1–7(k) (1961)).
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beyond the maximum authorized by the statute regulating the
substantive offense.”107
In its opinion, the Court recognized that the nonpayment of criminal
justice debt had become “a major cause of incarceration”108 and included
an appendix providing a state-by-state description of statutory
provisions relating to incarceration for failure to pay fines.109 Moreover,
the Court acknowledged that Griffin had created an obligation to
continue to address the unequal treatment of indigent defendants:110
In the years since the Griffin case the Court has had frequent occasion
to reaffirm allegiance to the basic command that justice be applied
equally to all persons. Subsequent decisions of this Court have
pointedly demonstrated that the passage of time has heightened
rather than weakened the attempts to mitigate the disparate
treatment of indigents in the criminal process.111

The Court also criticized the Illinois law for creating a two-tier system of
justice based on a defendant’s financial resources:112
[T]he Illinois statute as applied to Williams works an invidious
discrimination solely because he is unable to pay the fine. On its face
the statute extends to all defendants an apparently equal opportunity
for limiting confinement to the statutory maximum simply by
satisfying a money judgment. In fact, this is an illusory choice. . . . By
making the maximum confinement contingent upon one’s ability to
pay, the State has visited different consequences on two categories of
persons since the result is to make incarceration in excess of the
statutory maximum applicable only to those without the requisite
resources to satisfy the money portion of the judgment.113

In Tate v. Short,114 the Court extended the analysis of Williams to a
Texas traffic-fine-only statute.115 A municipal court had assessed fines of
$425 for traffic offenses that were not punishable by incarceration.116
Additionally, the court, relying on statutory provisions, ordered the
defendant, who was unable to pay the fines, to remain in prison for
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 246–59.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 241–42.
Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
401 U.S. 395 (1971).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 396–97.
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eighty-five days to satisfy the assessed fines at a rate of $5 per day.117
The Supreme Court applied Williams to find the procedure
unconstitutional:118
[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres
in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any
fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term and
whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the
maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing and able to
pay a fine. In each case, the Constitution prohibits the State from
imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it
into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot
forthwith pay the fine in full.119

The opinion not only identified the two-tier system of justice but also
acknowledged the inefficiency of using incarceration of indigents as a
method of obtaining revenue for the state:
Since Texas has legislated a “fines only” policy for traffic offenses,
that statutory ceiling cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection
Clause, limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to
pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent
defendant without the means to pay his fine. Imprisonment in such a
case is not imposed to further any penal objective of the State. It is
imposed to augment the State’s revenues but obviously does not
serve that purpose; the defendant cannot pay because he is indigent
and his imprisonment, rather than aiding collection of the revenue,
saddles the State with the cost of feeding and housing him for the
period of his imprisonment.120

While Williams and Tate dealt with the effect of the inability to pay
at the time of sentencing, in Bearden v. Georgia,121 the Court would face
whether probation could be revoked and incarceration imposed based
on a defendant’s inability to pay criminal justice debt.122 The trial court
granted Bearden a three-year probated sentence and assessed $750 in
117. Id. at 396–97 nn.3–4 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 45.53 (1966) and HOUSTON CODE § 35–
8).
118. Id. at 397–98.
119. Id. at 398 (citing Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970)).
120. Id. at 399.
121. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
122. Id. at 665 (stating the issue as “whether a sentencing court can revoke a defendant’s
probation for failure to pay the imposed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that the
defendant was somehow responsible for the failure or that alternative forms of punishment were
inadequate”).
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fines and restitution.123 Bearden entered into an installment plan;
however, within a month after release on probation, he lost his job and
was unable to secure employment.124 Based on his failure to pay, the
court revoked probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of the
probationary period in prison.125 The Georgia appellate courts denied
his appeal.126
More than twenty-five years after Griffin, the United States Supreme
Court found in Bearden that fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that, before revoking probation and incarcerating
a defendant for failure to pay, a court must consider the ability to pay or
alternative forms of punishment.127 In writing for the majority, Justice
O’Connor traced the development of “Griffin’s principle of ‘equal
justice.’”128 She began with Justice Black’s equal justice quotation from
Griffin and discussed the convergence of the due process and equal
protection concerns developed in Mayer, Douglas, Williams, and Tate.129
She concluded, “in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or
restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the
failure to pay.”130 Subsequent state court decisions, legislation, and court
rules would recognize the need for determining a defendant’s ability to
pay in deciding whether to incarcerate for unpaid criminal justice
debt.131
III. THE PROMISE UNFULFILLED: POVERTY AS INJUSTICE
If you have two defendants who do the exact same thing on the exact
same day and time, their experiences will be completely different
based on whether or not they have money. . . . [I]f they’re poor,
they’re gonna sit behind bars in jail and fight their case from behind
bars, but if they have money, they are going to be able to fully enjoy
that presumption of innocence that we’re all supposed to have where
they can pay and get out and return to their jobs, fight their case from

123. Id. at 662.
124. Id. at 662–63.
125. Id. at 663.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 672–73.
128. Id. at 664.
129. Id. at 664–68.
130. Id. at 672.
131. See Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons,
75 MD. L. REV. 486, 507 n.173 (2016) [hereinafter Sobol, Charging the Poor].
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the community and continue caring for their families, and they’re
going to have much better outcomes in their cases as well.132
—Leslie Turner (2019)

While Griffin in 1956 and Bearden in 1983 appeared to promise a
system where the ability to pay would not affect justice, Leslie Turner’s
comments in 2019 reflect that the two-tier system of criminal justice
remains.133 Turner became an advocate for criminal justice reform
following her incarceration based on her inability to pay traffic ticket
violations.134 Turner, the nursing mother of a four-month-old child,
spent five days in jail because she was unable to pay the $1,500 bail—an
amount that was more than her monthly income.135
In practice, at all levels—federal, state, and local—authorities are
not following the mandates and goals established and espoused by
Justice Black’s basic notion of equal justice.136 The growing reliance on
criminal justice debt has exacerbated the problems of inequality arising
from a defendant’s lack of financial resources. In March 2016, the
Department of Justice sent materials to the court administrators and
chief justices of every state addressing the illegal enforcement of fines
and fees.137 The materials included a “Dear Colleague” letter describing
the impact of such practices, including how “[i]ndividuals may confront
escalating debt; face repeated, unnecessary incarceration for
nonpayment despite posing no danger to the community; lose their jobs;
and become trapped in cycles of poverty that can be nearly impossible
to escape.”138 The letter relies on the Griffin progeny, including the
requirements established by Bearden.139
132. Brian Bahouth, Nevada Could Largely Scrap Money Bail System, Activists Hopeful, NEV. CAP.
NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://nevadacapitalnews.org/2019/03/18/nevada-could-scrap-moneybail-system-activists-hopeful/ (quoting Leslie Turner).
133. Id.
134. Jeniffer Solis, Fines & Fees Sent Nursing Mother to Jail for Traffic Tickets, NEV. CURRENT (June
5, 2018), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2018/06/05/system-of-fines-and-fees-sent-nursingmother-to-jail-for-traffic-tickets/.
135. Id.
136. As a practical matter, Griffin presents financial and logistical hurdles if the true goal is that
all defendants have equal means. See POWE, supra note 4, at 107 (declaring that Justice “Black made
Griffin an egalitarian delight to read but an enigma to apply in new circumstances”).
137. Justice Department Announces Resources to Assist State and Local Reform of Fine and Fee
Practices, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentannounces-resources-assist-state-and-local-reform-fine-and-fee-practices.
138. Open Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to State and Local Courts, Dear Colleague 2 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter
.org/content/uploads/2018/11/Dear-Colleague-letter.pdf.
139. Id. at 3. In 2017, the Department of Justice withdrew the Dear Colleague Letter as part of its
regulatory reform program. Attorney General Jeff Sessions Rescinds 25 Guidance Documents, U.S.
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This Part briefly discusses the expanding role of criminal justice
debt in the modern American criminal justice system and how the failure
to take into account ability to pay has created a two-tier system of
justice.
A. The Growth of Criminal Justice Debt
Despite Griffin’s promise of a system where justice would be
rendered independent of wealth, indigent defendants currently face a
system where the imposition of criminal justice debt creates injustice.
Criminal justice debt, also commonly referred to as legal financial
obligations or LFOs, includes a wide range of monetary charges assessed
in the criminal justice system.140 While all jurisdictions assess LFOs, the
terms they use vary.141 Assessments, bail, costs, fees, fines, restitution,
and surcharges are common examples.142
Since the 1980s, criminal justice debt in the United States has
grown exponentially.143 Defendants now face financial assessments at
every stage in the process from pre-conviction to supervision after
release.144 Pre-conviction charges include fees for arrest, booking, lab
tests, and bail.145 Some jurisdictions also charge for pre-trial detention
for defendants unable to make bail.146 Defendants who seek a public
defender will likely be charged an application fee.147
At sentencing, defendants are not only subject to fines and
restitution but also face court costs, mandatory surcharges,

DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-res
cinds-25-guidance-documents.
140. ABBY SHAFROTH & LARRY SCHWARTZOL, CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: THE URGENT NEED
FOR COMPREHENSIVE REFORM, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM & NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. 2 (Sept. 2016).
141. ALEXES HARRIS ET AL., MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (Apr. 2017).
142. Fines, Fees, and Bail, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF 1 (Dec. 2015); SHAFROTH &
SCHWARTZOL, supra note 140, at 2.
143. Neil L. Sobol, Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to Combat Criminal
Justice Debt Abuses, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 855 (2017) [hereinafter Sobol, Fighting Fines]. A detailed
discussion of the growth in criminal justice debt is beyond the scope of this Article. For more
information, see Brittany Friedman & Mary Pattillo, Statutory Inequality: The Logics of Monetary
Sanctions in State Law, 5(1) RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. OF THE SOC. SCI. 173, 177–78 (2019); Targeted
Fines and Fees Against Communities of Color: Civil Rights & Constitutional Implications, U.S. COMM’N
ON CIV. RIGHTS 7–14 (Sept. 2017),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf.
144. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 499–504.
145. Id. at 502.
146. See, e.g., RYAN GENTZLER, THE COST TRAP: HOW EXCESSIVE FEES LOCK OKLAHOMANS INTO THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM WITHOUT BOOSTING STATE REVENUE, OKLA. POL’Y INST. 6 (Feb. 2017)
(identifying jail fees assessed in Oklahoma).
147. Id. at 4–5.

2020]

Griffin v. Illinois: Justice Independent of Wealth?

417

reimbursement charges, and discretionary fees.148 For example, “[t]wothirds of states allow judges to require defendants to pay for a courtappointed public defender.”149 If incarcerated, the monetary charges
continue to accrue as inmates are likely to be assessed charges for room
and board, medical care, and telephone usage.150 Convicted defendants
on probation or parole also face fees for supervision, monitoring, and
drug testing.151
Explanations for the expansion of criminal justice debt include the
growth in correctional control, budgetary pressure on states and local
municipalities, and the outsourcing of services to private companies.152
1. Expansion of Correctional Control
The United States leads the world with nearly 2.3 million people
incarcerated and an incarceration “rate more than five times higher than
most other nations.”153 Since 1980, mass incarceration developed as the
number of people incarcerated increased more than fourfold.154
Additionally, more than 4.4 million people are under probation or parole
supervision in the United States.155 As a result, nearly 7 million people
are subject to correctional control in the United States.156
The move toward mass incarceration and supervision that began in
the 1970s created increased costs to run a burgeoning system. In 2015,
governmental expenditures on criminal justice represented $937 per
capita—a significant increase over 1982’s real per capita spending of
$388.157 Not surprisingly, an increase in monetary sanctions against
criminal defendants has been associated with the increased spending by
governmental authorities.158
148. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 141, at 11–12; Sobol, Fighting Fines, supra note 143, at 864.
149. ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 42
(2016).
150. Sobol, Fighting Fines, supra note 143, at 864–65.
151. Id. at 865.
152. HARRIS, supra note 149, at 10; Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 508–12.
153. New Report, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, Provides Annual “Big Picture” View of
Confinement in the U.S. with 7 New Infographics, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/03/19/whole-pie/ [hereinafter New Report, Mass
Incarceration].
154. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2016) (identifying “the incarcerated population is 4.5 times
larger than in 1980”).
155. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.
156. Id.
157. PATRICK LIU, RYAN NUNN & JAY SHAMBAUGH, NINE FACTS ABOUT MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (2019).
158. Id. at 5.
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2. Budgetary Pressures
Budgetary concerns arising from increased criminal justice
expenditures and the economic recession in 2008 created even more
pressure for jurisdictions to collect fines and fees.159 Relying on criminal
justice debt as a means of funding activities—including activities
unrelated to the charged offenses—has political advantages over
increasing taxes.160
The problem is not a new one as municipalities have long used
traffic stops as a means of collecting revenue; however, it has grown in
scope with claims that states are using “‘cash register justice,’ ‘policing
for profit,’” and over-reliance on monetary charges as an enforcement
tool, often without regard to public safety.161
For example, the 2015 Department of Justice investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department found that the municipality, police, and
court “worked in concert to maximize revenue at every stage of the
enforcement process.”162 Focusing on funding the city’s operating
budget rather than public safety, the city created fine-able offenses,
police were rewarded for issuing citations, and the court imposed fines
and fees.163 Attorney General Eric Holder categorized the Ferguson
report as “searing” but also cautioned that the concerns were “not
confined to any one city, state, or geographic region.”164
Similar to the findings in Ferguson, jurisdictions have not only
increased fines for offenses but have also established monetary
penalties for new offenses.165 The rise in new offenses such as loitering,
panhandling, and camping in public has been criticized as criminalizing
poverty and homelessness.166
159. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 7.
160. Friedman & Pattillo, supra note 143, at 178 (stating that “[t]he anti-tax political climate
ascendant since the 1970s has required legislators to look elsewhere for additional revenues”).
161. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 2.
162. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 10
(2015). For a more detailed discussion of the Ferguson report, see Neil L. Sobol, Lessons Learned
from Ferguson: Ending Abusive Collection of Criminal Justice Debt, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER
& CLASS 293 (2015).
163. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 12–13; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 162, at
2–4.
164. Eric Holder, Attorney General Holder Delivers Update on Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holderdelivers-update-investigations-ferguson-missouri.
165. KAREN DOLAN & JODI L. CARR, THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 5 (2015).
166. See id. at 23–25 (describing how “[p]eople without homes are increasingly targeted,
criminalized, and arrested”); NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 17 (2014).
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While fines have increased in amount and numbers, fees have seen
the most dramatic increase among monetary charges assessed to
defendants.167 Often fees (including court costs and surcharges) exceed
the fines and are unrelated to the underlying offenses.168 For example, a
study from Oklahoma comparing the relative increase in fines and fees
from 1992 to 2016 resulted in “an odd dynamic” where the fees rather
than the fine create “a financial burden that is far beyond many
Oklahomans’ ability to pay.”169 Similarly, a report from Texas found that
the fees and court costs associated with a $100 traffic ticket can exceed
$365.170
3. Outsourcing
Facing financial stress, jurisdictions have outsourced services to
private companies.171 Privatization includes not only the development
of privately run prisons, but also the growing reliance on private
companies for a “variety of services and processes within U.S.
courthouses, jails, and prisons.”172 Although private prisons house only
seven percent of inmates, nearly all inmates are subject to fees for
services provided by private companies—including telephone usage,
food, and medical care.173 More than fifty percent of governmental
expenditures for incarceration are paid to private vendors.174 Private
companies may be involved at all stages of a defendant’s interaction with
the justice system from pre-trial, including bail and testing services; to
incarceration, including communication and food services; to
supervision, including probation, monitoring, and drug testing
services.175 Additionally, many jurisdictions use private collectors for
the collection of criminal justice debt.176
Private companies often provide “offender-funded” programs that
are attractive to jurisdictions facing budgetary concerns. Under
offender-funding, private companies offer their services without
167. HARRIS, supra note 149, at 23.
168. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 141, at 11–14.
169. GENTZLER, supra note 146, at 2–3.
170. TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT, supra note 7, at 5.
171. HARRIS, supra note 149, at 10.
172. Alexes Harris, Tyler Smith & Emmi Obara, Justice “Cost Points”: Examination of Privatization
Within Public Systems of Justice, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 343, 344 (2019).
173. New Report, Mass Incarceration, supra note 153.
174. WORTH RISES, THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: MAPPING PRIVATE SECTOR PLAYERS 1 (2019).
175. Harris, Smith & Obara, supra note 172, at 344–47; BRIAN HIGHSMITH, COMMERCIALIZED
(IN)JUSTICE: CONSUMER ABUSES IN THE BAIL AND CORRECTIONS INDUSTRY 4–6 (2019).
176. See, e.g., PAULINA MAQUEDA ESCAMILLA, UNHOLY ALLIANCE: CALIFORNIA COURTS’ USE OF PRIVATE
DEBT COLLECTORS 2–3 (2018).
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charging jurisdictions any fees, instead relying on their funding solely
through fees collected from defendants.177 Some jurisdictions even
receive “commissions,” which critics have categorized as “kickbacks”
from private companies.178
Critics of privatization in the criminal justice system raise concerns
about the potential abuses arising from the profit-based motivation of
private companies.179 Often, the services that private companies provide
and the charges they assess are subject to limited and, in some cases, no
regulation.180 For example, some private phone companies charge
inmates exorbitant fees.181 Similarly, private probation companies,
when receiving money from probationers that should be allocated to
court debt and probation supervision fees, may subtract their fees
before the court debt so that individuals remain in default and subject to
arrest warrants for the outstanding debt.182 Additionally, commission
arrangements with private collectors that provide a greater percentage
on older debt encourage collectors to pursue older debt while letting
other debt “age so that they can collect on it later and receive higher
commission fees.”183
B. Two-Tier System of Justice
The growth in criminal justice debt and the assessment of debt
without taking into account the ability to pay has created a two-tier
justice system. This differential treatment traps many indigent
defendants and their families in a perpetual cycle of debt.184
177. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “SET UP TO FAIL”: THE IMPACT OF OFFENDER-FUNDED PRIVATE PROBATION
ON THE POOR 18–19 (2018); U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 14; Sobol, Fighting Fines,
supra note 143, at 866.
178. HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 21–22; Tim Requarth, How Private Equity Is Turning Public
Prisons into Big Profits, THE NATION (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/prisonprivatization-private-equity-hig/.
179. Requarth, supra note 178 (stating “a handful of privately held companies dominate the
correctional-services market, many with troubling records of price gouging some of the poorest
families and violating the human rights of prisoners”); see also HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 1–5;
Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 523–24.
180. HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 13–16; see, e.g., ESCAMILLA, supra note 176, at 2–3 (finding that
collection of criminal justice debt was not subject to federal or California collection laws and that
“[o]f the 17 counties studied [for use of private debt collectors], only one private collections agency
was subject to a Code of Ethics in their service agreement”).
181. HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 34–35; Neil L. Sobol, Connecting the Disconnected:
Communication Technologies for the Incarcerated, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 559, 581–84 (2018)
[hereinafter Sobol, Connecting the Disconnected].
182. Harris, Smith & Obara, supra note 172, at 347.
183. ESCAMILLA, supra note 176, at 14.
184. ABBY SHAFROTH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT IN THE SOUTH: A PRIMER FOR THE SOUTHERN PARTNERSHIP
TO REDUCE DEBT 3 (2018).

2020]

Griffin v. Illinois: Justice Independent of Wealth?

421

Additionally, the fear of arrest, incarceration, and additional monetary
sanctions arising from outstanding criminal justice debt strains the
relationship that defendants have with law enforcement and judicial
authorities.185 This Part will briefly identify how the system treats
indigent defendants differently than those who have financial resources.
1. Poverty Penalties
When a defendant is unable to pay criminal justice debt, it is not
uncommon for the defendant to face additional monetary charges.
Critics label these charges “poverty penalties.”186 Those who can afford
the initial debt are not subject to the additional fees. Examples of poverty
penalties include charges for interest, late payments, payment plans, and
collection services.187
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, if a defendant cannot pay bail, the
court may allow installment payments but also require electronic
monitoring. Such defendants may then be subject to additional charges,
including fees for installation, calibration, monthly monitoring, and
removal.188
2. Collateral Consequences
The collateral consequences that accompany unpaid debt
compound the problems that indigent defendants face.189 Similar to the
concerns expressed in Mayer that a conviction could prevent a medical
185. Id. at 6. In Mayer v. City of Chicago, the Court had predicted frustration and hostility created
by the imposition of criminal justice debt. 404 U.S. 189, 197–98 (1971). See supra text
accompanying notes 61–62; see also U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 11–12 (assessing
and collecting monetary sanctions to fund governmental activities without regard to public safety
turns police and the courts into tax collectors and creates distrust).
186. Rebecca Vallas & Roopal Patel, Sentenced to a Life of Criminal Debt: A Barrier to Reentry and
Climbing out of Poverty, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 133 (2012). The Criminal
Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School maintains a searchable database of state laws
regarding poverty penalties and poverty traps reflecting enforcement mechanisms that states use
to collect criminal justice debt. Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School: 50-State
Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder, CRIM. J. POL’Y PROGRAM, https://cjdebtreform.org/dataexplorer/enforcement-mechanisms (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).
187. Vallas & Patel, supra note 186, at 133.
188. HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 30. Georgia also has a system of “pay only probation” where
defendants are placed under supervision because of their inability to pay criminal justice debt,
subjecting them to up to three months of supervision fees. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 141, at 15–16.
189. A full discussion of the collateral consequences that defendants may face is beyond the
scope of this Article. For more information, see MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & WAYNE A.
LOGAN, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2018),
Westlaw, COLLATC database. To access a searchable database of collateral consequences, see
Welcome to the NICCC, NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION,
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).
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student from practicing medicine,190 those with unpaid criminal debt
may be denied occupational licenses.191 Additionally, the debt may
disqualify them from public assistance benefits192 and the right to
vote.193
Moreover, more than forty states suspend driver’s licenses for
failure to pay court debt.194 Estimates are that “[m]ore than 7 million
people nationwide may have had their driver’s licenses suspended for
failure to pay court or administrative debt.”195 Studies show that driver’s
license suspensions adversely impact the ability of defendants to retain
and obtain employment.196 The suspensions lead to recidivism and
safety concerns as many defendants faced with the prospect of the loss
of employment become unlicensed and uninsured drivers.197 In one
case, a driver’s license was suspended because the defendant was unable
to pay a $135 traffic fine.198 Fearful of losing her job, which required that
she drive, she continued to drive and received additional tickets for
driving without a license.199 She was also subject to increased insurance
premiums, which resulted in the debt “spiral[ing] into more than
$13,000 over four and half years.”200
3. Incarceration
While additional charges and collateral consequences are difficult
on indigent defendants, the loss of liberty has even more significant
190. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
191. Vallas & Patel, supra note 186, at 135.
192. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.C., AT ALL COSTS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF RISING COURT FINES AND
FEES IN NORTH CAROLINA 17 (2019); Vallas & Patel, supra note 186, at 136.
193. See Colgan, supra note 21, at 65 (concluding that wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
is authorized in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia); ALLYSON FREDERICKSEN & LINNEA
LASSITER, DISENFRANCHISED BY DEBT: MILLIONS IMPOVERISHED BY PRISON, BLOCKED FROM VOTING 5 (2016).
194. Beth Schwartzapfel, 43 States Suspend Licenses for Unpaid Court Debt, But That Could
Change, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 21, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2017/11/21/43-states-suspend-licenses-for-unpaid-court-debt-but-that-could-change.
195. Justin Wm. Moyer, More than 7 Million People May Have Lost Driver’s Licenses Because of
Traffic Debt, WASH. POST (May 19, 2018, 4:18 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/more-than-7-million-people-may-have-lost-drivers-licenses-because-oftraffic-debt/2018/05/19/97678c08-5785-11e8-b656a5f8c2a9295d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6885de9bacd3.
196. See MARIO SALAS & ANGELA CIOLFI, DRIVEN BY DOLLARS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF DRIVER’S
LICENSE SUSPENSION LAWS FOR FAILURE TO PAY COURT DEBT 3–5 (2017); U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra
note 143, at 35–37.
197. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 36–37.
198. Emily R. Dindial & Ronald J. Lampard, Opinion, When a Traffic Ticket Costs $13,000:
Suspending Driver’s Licenses for Unpaid Fees Buries Poor People in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/opinion/drivers-license-suspension-fees.html.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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ramifications. On any given day, local jails hold more than 450,000
individuals who have not been convicted of any crime. Many of them
remain incarcerated simply because they cannot afford bail.201
Cash bail inherently discriminates against those who lack financial
resources. Moreover, the correlation between race and wealth leads to
disproportionate harm for Black and Latinx defendants that “[i]mplicit
and explicit racial biases” further exacerbate.202 Studies show that pretrial detainees are more likely to plead guilty and more likely to receive
longer sentences than those who can afford bail.203
Just as they face detention based on inability to pay bail, indigent
defendants may face incarceration if they cannot pay other criminal
justice debt. Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Bearden in 1983, as
well as subsequent legislation, rules, and case law, courts often do not
hold meaningful ability to pay hearings before incarcerating individuals
for failure to make payments.204 Numerous reports indicate the
prevalence of modern-day debtors’ prisons.205
While incarcerated, defendants are subject to additional criminal
justice debt for necessities, including food and health care.206 If inmates
want to communicate with their families, they may be assessed
exorbitant fees for telephone and video services.207 The increased fees
201. Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 155.
202. COLIN DOYLE ET AL., BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 7 (2019); see also
Samantha Melamed, In Philly, Your Race Predicts Whether You’ll Be Locked Up or Go Free Until Trial,
Study Says, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.philly.com/news/philly-money-bailcriminal-justice-community-bail-fund-20190429.html (describing a study in Philadelphia that
black defendants remain “awaiting trial at a rate 25 percent higher than their white counterparts”);
Lucius Couloute, New Data Highlights Pre-Incarceration Disadvantages, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar.
22, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/03/22/brookingsreport_2018/ (describing
a study reflecting “that those who end up in prison disproportionately come from disadvantaged
communities of color with high levels of poverty and unemployment”).
203. DOYLE ET AL., supra note 202, at 8; Melamed, supra note 202.
204. See, e.g., GENTZLER, supra note 146, at 8 (identifying that “[i]n practice, many—if not most—
courts” do not follow the requirements of the Oklahoma statute requiring ability to pay hearings);
PA. INTERBRANCH COMM’N FOR GENDER, RACIAL & ETHNIC FAIRNESS, ENDING DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN
PENNSYLVANIA 14 (2017) (declaring that “Pennsylvania courts routinely fail to assess a defendant’s
ability to pay before imposing incarceration”).
205. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’
PRISONS 5 (2010); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF LA., LOUISIANA’S DEBTORS PRISONS: AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE
9 (2015); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEB., UNEQUAL JUSTICE: BAIL AND MODERN DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS
IN NEBRASKA 30 (2016); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.H., DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 1
(2015); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, THE OUTSKIRTS OF HOPE: HOW OHIO’S DEBTORS’ PRISONS ARE
RUINING LIVES AND COSTING COMMUNITIES 9 (2013); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TEX., NO EXIT, TEXAS:
MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS AND THE POVERTY TRAP 5–7 (2016); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH.
& COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS PUNISH
PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 3 (2014). For a detailed discussion of modern-day debtors’ prisons, see
Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131.
206. Harris, Smith & Obara, supra note 172, at 346.
207. Id.
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along with collateral consequences stemming from incarceration,
including loss of employment and reduction in credit scores, make it
even more difficult for indigent defendants to escape the debt cycle.208
IV. RESTORING THE PROMISE: REFORMS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Recognizing the failure to achieve Justice Black’s ideal of equal
justice, some jurisdictions have adopted proposals that aim to restore
Griffin’s notion of equal justice. This Part will describe these reforms as
well as suggest additional alternatives to help combat the injustice that
defendants with limited financial resources face.209 All reforms adopted
should be subject to effective enforcement as well as continued study,
review, and evaluation.210
A. Correctional Control Reforms
Incarceration and supervision have a disproportionate impact on
low-income defendants.211 Reforming correctional controls so that they
are not based upon defendants’ ability to pay has the potential to
promote equal justice.
1. Incarceration
Bail reform is necessary to reduce the number of people who
remain incarcerated solely because they cannot afford bail.212 Several
208. Vallas & Patel, supra note 186, at 135–36.
209. Previously, I have addressed and developed in more detail several of these reforms. See
Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 524–39 (developing a framework for reducing
incarceration of indigents who fail to pay criminal justice debt); Sobol, Fighting Fines, supra note
143, at 896–98 (discussing a federal approach to addressing criminal justice debt issues). The
American Bar Association and the National Task Force on Fines and Fees have also established
guidelines and principles that reflect several of the suggested reforms. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA TEN
GUIDELINES ON COURT FINES AND FEES (2018) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]; NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES,
& BAIL PRACTICES, PRINCIPLES ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES (2019) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
210. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 538–39 (advocating establishing a complaint
forum, monitoring, oversight, reporting, enforcement, and continual study); see also CRIM. JUST. POL’Y
PROGRAM, CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A GUIDE FOR POLICY REFORM 32–38 (2016) (discussing
legislative, judicial, and executive reforms to “enhance transparency and promote accountability”);
GLENN A. GRANT, 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 46 (2019) (recognizing the need
for funding and continual review and study of New Jersey’s criminal justice reform program).
211. Alexi Jones, Correctional Control 2018: Incarceration and Supervision by State, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Dec. 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/ correctionalcontrol2018.html;
Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 155; see also Couloute, supra note 202 (describing a report finding
that “boys born into families at the bottom 10% of the income distribution are 20 times more likely
to experience prison in their 30s than their peers born into the top 10%”).
212. PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 5–6; DOYLE ET AL., supra note 202, at 6–9 (discussing the need
for bail reform and evaluating bail reform alternatives).
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jurisdictions have implemented or are considering proposals for pretrial alternatives to monetary bail.213 For example, in 2017, New Jersey
enacted reforms aimed at eliminating cash bail systems, and the results
have been labeled as positive.214 Under the new system, the basis for pretrial detention is risk analysis rather than cash payments.215 Early
results seem promising as more than 94% of defendants were released
pre-trial, the jail population decreased by 20%, and only forty-four
defendants were subject to cash bail.216 Additionally, more than 80% of
release decisions were made within twenty-four hours of arrest, and
only 0.5% of release decisions were made after forty-eight hours of
arrest.217 The reforms have not resulted in increased crime or increased
rates of non-appearance for trial.218 A 2019 report to the New Jersey
governor concluded:
New Jersey’s jail population looks very different today than it did
when the idea of reforming the state’s criminal justice system began
to take hold in 2013. On any given day, there are thousands fewer
defendants in jail, with only the highest-risk defendants and those
charged with the most serious offenses detained.
In all, CJR [criminal justice reform] has reduced the unnecessary
detention of low-risk defendants, assured community safety, upheld
constitutional principles, and preserved the integrity of the criminal
justice process.219

While bail reform addresses incarceration before conviction, reforms
are also necessary for post-conviction incarceration stemming from the
inability to pay. Indigent defendants should not be incarcerated simply
213. DOYLE ET AL., supra note 202, app. B at 33 (identifying bail reforms and innovations in
thirteen jurisdictions).
214. Id. app. B at 44. Study Finds New Jersey’s Pretrial Reform Shows Early Signs of Wide-Reaching,
Positive Impacts on Criminal Justice System, ARNOLD VENTURES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.arnold
ventures.org/newsroom/study-finds-new-jerseys-pretrial-reform-shows-early-signs-of-widereaching-positive-impacts-on-criminal-justice-system.
215. GRANT, supra note 210, at 3. A detailed discussion of the use of risk assessment programs is
beyond the scope of this Article. For more information about pretrial risk assessment programs and
the potential for racial bias in such algorithms, see SARAH PICARD ET AL., BEYOND THE ALGORITHM:
PRETRIAL REFORM, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND RACIAL FAIRNESS (2019).
216. DOYLE ET AL., supra note 202, app. B at 49.
217. Id.
218. New Jersey Reform Leader Says Better Data Strengthened Bail System, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS (May 1, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2019/
05/01/ new-jersey-reform-leader-says-better-data-strengthened-bail-system.
219. GRANT, supra note 210, at 3. The New Jersey reform plan is the subject of continual review,
including a series of reports conducted by the MDRC Center for Criminal Justice Research. See CHLOE
ANDERSON ET AL., EVALUATION OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORMS THAT USE THE PUBLIC SAFETY
ASSESSMENT: EFFECTS OF NEW JERSEY’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2 (2019).
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because they cannot pay criminal justice debt. Reforms to help achieve
this goal include:
•

Ending the practice of incarceration based on failure to pay
fees.220

•

Ending the practice of incarceration for inability to pay fine-only
offenses.221

•

Establishing standards to allow judges to determine whether
defendants have the ability to pay criminal justice debt.222

•

Providing notice and training to judges, prosecutors, defense
counsel, and defendants about the standards.223

•

Allowing incarceration for failure to pay criminal justice debt only
if the court after a meaningful and recorded hearing (where an
indigent defendant is provided counsel) determines that the
defendant, based on the established standards, has the ability to
pay the debt.224

•

Establishing alternatives to incarceration for defendants whom
the court determines do not have the current ability to pay the
criminal justice debt.225 For alternatives that may require
services such as monitoring, fees should be reduced or waived
based on the defendant’s financial resources.226

220. See Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 534–35 (limiting remedies for failure to pay
fees to civil remedies).
221. TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT, supra note 7, at 36.
222. GUIDELINES, supra note 209, at 11; CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 210, at 26–32
(discussing legislative, judicial, and executive reforms to improve ability to pay determinations).
Additionally, care should be taken to make sure that the standards established are not racially
biased. See Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-to-Pay Determinations are Inadequate to
Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 176–81 (2019).
223. GUIDELINES, supra note 209, at 7; CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 210, at 27, 30–31;
PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 6; Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 537.
224. GUIDELINES, supra note 209, at 3–8; MYESHA BRADEN ET AL., TOO POOR TO PAY: HOW ARKANSAS’S
OFFENDER-FUNDED JUSTICE SYSTEM DRIVES POVERTY & MASS INCARCERATION 25–26 (2019); PRINCIPLES,
supra note 209, at 6; Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 535; U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS,
supra note 143, at 75.
225. GUIDELINES, supra note 209, at 10; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 177, at 8–9; PRINCIPLES,
supra note 209, at 6; Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 536–37; U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS,
supra note 143, at 75–76.
226. HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 42; PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 6–7.
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2. Supervision
As with bail reform, evidence-based approaches focusing on risk
and treatment needs should be adopted in the community supervision
arena.227 Studies demonstrate that while supervision can be effective for
high-risk offenders, it can be counterproductive for low-risk
offenders.228 Community supervision reforms have demonstrated the
potential for reducing community supervision while at the same time
reducing recidivism and costs.229
B. Reforms in Assessing and Collecting Fines and Fees
Reforms aimed at eliminating, reducing, or waiving criminal justice
debt can also promote equal justice. Such reforms include:
•

Eliminating all fines and fees. Given budgetary concerns and the
deterrence potential of fines, the adoption of this proposal is
unlikely.230

•

Establishing periodic review of fines and fees to determine
whether charges should be modified because they are
excessive.231

•

Requiring state and local authorities to evaluate offenses that
have fines to determine whether such offenses should be
eliminated because they focus only on revenue generation or
criminalizing poverty.232

•

Eliminating the use of poverty penalties.233

•

Establishing amnesty and debt-forgiveness programs.234

•

Evaluating whether fees are appropriate.235 In many situations,
the efforts at collecting fees are counterproductive with

227. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIGH STAKES, MISSED
OPPORTUNITIES 14–15 (2018).
228. Id. at 12.
229. Id. at 13–14.
230. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 524–26.
231. PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 6.
232. See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 166, at 10–11; Sobol, Charging
the Poor, supra note 131, at 533.
233. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 210, at 15–26 (discussing legislative, judicial, and
executive reforms to address poverty penalties).
234. GENTZLER, supra note 146, at 19.
235. PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 3; Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 533–34.
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jurisdictions spending more on collection efforts than they
receive.236 In 2018, San Francisco “became the first county in the
nation to eliminate all locally administered fees charged to people
leaving the criminal justice system.”237 Estimates are that the
benefits from eliminating over 32 million dollars in fees for over
twenty-one thousand, mostly low-income, defendants will exceed
the expected one million dollar loss in revenue.238 Alameda
County has followed San Francisco’s example, and legislation that
would eliminate fees throughout California is pending.239
Similarly, New York City has eliminated phone fees for jailed
inmates.240
•

Providing courts should have flexibility to modify or waive fines
and fees or use alternatives to criminal justice debt based on
defendants’ financial resources.241

C. Reforms to Reduce Collateral Consequences
Just as jurisdictions should consider eliminating or reducing fines
and fees, jurisdictions should examine laws, regulations, and practices
that result in collateral consequences.242 For example, ending programs
that suspend driver’s licenses for failure to pay fines and fees would
236. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 131, at 533–34; Anne Stuhldreher, Op-Ed: Counties
Rarely Collect Fees Imposed on Those Formerly Jailed. So Why Keep Charging Them?, L.A. TIMES, May
16, 2019, 3:05 AM, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-stuhldreher-fees-criminaljustice-reform-20190516-story.html; see also THERESA ZHEN & BRANDON GREENE, PAY OR PREY: HOW
THE ALAMEDA COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EXTRACTS WEALTH FROM MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES 14
(2018) (reporting an annual net loss in Alameda County from collections of criminal justice debt of
1.3 million dollars).
237. Stuhldreher, supra note 236, at 6.
238. OFFICE OF THE TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR CITY & CTY. OF S.F., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE
FEES: HIGH PAIN FOR PEOPLE, LOW GAIN FOR GOVERNMENT 6 (2019). This report was issued to provide
guidance to other California counties considering the elimination of administrative fees. Id. at 1.
239. Stuhldreher, supra note 236, at 6. Senate Bill 144 eliminating administrative fees
throughout California has passed the California Senate. Senate OKs Holly J. Mitchell Bill to End Admin
Fees
for
the
Formerly
Incarcerated,
EAST
CTY.
TODAY
(June
1,
2019),
https://eastcountytoday.net/senate-oks-holly-j-mitchell-bill-to-end-admin-fees-for-the-formerlyincarcerated/.
240. Karen Matthews, NYC Makes Calls from Jail Free, 1st Major US City To Do So, AP NEWS (May
1, 2019), https://apnews.com/55aecae91b2f41bcb2c3ff67186ffc6c.
241. GUIDELINES, supra note 209, at 1–2; CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, supra note 210, at 19–22;
PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 6; SHAFROTH, supra note 184, at 8–9. An alternative that is beyond the
scope of this Article is the use of day-fine systems such as those used by several European countries.
Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103 IOWA L. REV. 53
(2017) (examining the limited experiences in the United States with day fines).
242. GENTZLER, supra note 146, at 19. For a more detailed discussion of reforms aimed at
reducing collateral consequences, see MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, REDUCING BARRIERS TO
REINTEGRATION: FAIR CHANCE AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018 (2019); MARGARET LOVE, JOSH GAINES
& JENNY OSBORNE, FORGIVING & FORGETTING IN AMERICAN JUSTICE: A 50-STATE GUIDE TO EXPUNGEMENT AND
RESTORATION OF RIGHTS (2018).
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significantly help indigent defendants.243 Recently, several jurisdictions
have eliminated such programs—including California, Idaho,
Mississippi, Montana, and Washington, D.C.244 Even traditional political
foes—the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Legislative
Exchange Council—agree that license suspensions should focus on
driver safety rather than debt collection.245
Similarly, modifying laws that restrict occupational licenses or deny
public assistance due to unpaid criminal justice debt should be examined
because they affect the ability of defendants and their families to escape
the poverty debt cycle.246 States should also eliminate laws that allow for
voter disenfranchisement due to unpaid fines and fees.247
D. Regulation of Private Companies
Given the prevalence of private companies in the correctional
control industry and the potential for abuse, regulating the role of
private companies is also necessary. Regulations and contract
provisions should minimize conflicts of interests in the selection,
retention, and payment of private companies.248 Oversight,
transparency, accountability, and appropriate enforcement mechanisms
are essential in monitoring the activities of private companies.249
Many of the private companies in the corrections industry provide
technology services, including electronic monitoring, phone, banking,
and computer services.250 Although technology offers alternatives to
help address some of the inequities associated with being poor,251
technology can also exacerbate access and debt issues, especially when
companies employ abusive fee arrangements.252 Moreover, using
services such as video visitation may also not be as effective as in-person
243. SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 196, at 8–11.
244. Ted Alcorn, Handcuffed and Arrested for Not Paying a Traffic Ticket, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/nyregion/suspending-licenses-minor-offense-money.
html; Governor Bullock Signs HB 217 into Law, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF MONT. (May 8, 2019, 9:30
AM), https://www.aclumontana.org/en/news/governor-bullock-signs-hb-217-law-0.
245. Dindial & Lampard, supra note 198.
246. See Vallas & Patel, supra note 186, at 135–36.
247. GUIDELINES, supra note 209, at 5; SHAFROTH, supra note 184, at 16.
248. HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 41–42; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 177, at 7–8.
249. HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 41–42; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 177, at 7–8.
250. Harris, Smith & Obara, supra note 172, at 349–51; HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 30–36.
251. For example, technology is often looked at as an aid to help with access to justice. See
Rebecca Kunkel, Rationing Justice in the 21st Century: Technocracy and Technology in the Access to
Justice Movement, 18 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 366, 380–88 (2018).
252. HIGHSMITH, supra note 175, at 30–36; see, e.g., Sobol, Connecting the Disconnected, supra note
181, at 584–91 (discussing advantages and disadvantages to technology alternatives from
communications between inmates and their families).
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visitation—so complete displacement of traditional services may not be
appropriate.253 As such, regulation is necessary to address not only fees
but also the quality and types of services provided.
E. Application of the Eighth Amendment
A recent Supreme Court case, Timbs v. Indiana,254 provides another
potential tool for attacking monetary sanctions in criminal cases. The
Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause applies
in state court.255 In its opinion, the Court recognized the growing
concerns about jurisdictions improperly using criminal justice debt as a
funding mechanism:256
[F]ines may be employed “in a measure out of accord with the penal
goals of retribution and deterrence,” for “fines are a source of
revenue,” while other forms of punishment “cost a State money.” This
concern is scarcely hypothetical. See Brief for American Civil
Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 7 (“Perhaps because they are
politically easier to impose than generally applicable taxes, state and
local governments nationwide increasingly depend heavily on fines
and fees as a source of general revenue.”).257

Whether the Eighth Amendment will be an effective method of policing
criminal justice debt imposed by the states remains uncertain. Timbs
dealt with civil forfeiture and did not establish a procedure for
determining whether a fine is excessive.258
V. CONCLUSION
In an article, published a year after Griffin, the authors pondered the
fate of the case, noting that the fabled Griffin “had the head and wings of
an eagle, ‘the bird of freedom,’ while it had the more earthbound body of

253. Sobol, Connecting the Disconnected, supra note 181, at 589–91.
254. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
255. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687.
256. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689.
257. Id. (citation omitted).
258. Id. at 689–90. Scholars have also addressed the use of the Eighth Amendment regarding
criminal justice debt. See Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’
Prison, 65 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 2 (2018); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. 277 (2014); Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind
Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319, 320–21 (2014).
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a lion.”259 The authors accurately predicted that Griffin would face
hurdles:
It is of the very genius of our common law that a principle such
as is embodied in the Griffin case can find fruition only in the
work of thousands of individual judges and other lawmakers.
To the extent that the principle of the Griffin case finds
acceptance it will constitute a new charter of freedom for the
poor. It will be years, perhaps decades, however, before we can
know whether the Griffin “eagle” will fly or will remain
earthbound. Some cases expand and grow; other cases wither
and die. Griffin will meet vast obstacles: inertia, complacency,
economy, bitter resentment.260
Now, more than six decades after Griffin, subsequent judicial
decisions and legislation do reflect some flight; however, in practice, the
predicted obstacles have grounded the aspirations of Griffin and its
progeny. Reforms should be adopted to allow Griffin’s promise of equal
justice to fly. As Bryan Stevenson recognizes, “[t]he true measure of our
character is how we treat the poor, the disfavored, the accused, the
incarcerated, and the condemned.”261

259. Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 4, at 26.
260. Id.
261. STEVENSON, supra note 2, at 18.

